

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

Copy No... C

147



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

25X1

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800220001-0

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800220001-0

7 March 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

2. Communist China - USSR:

25X1

6. Notes: Congo; Ghana; Guatemala. (Page 9)

25X1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt


25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800220001-0

25X1

Communist China - USSR

25X1



7 Mar 66

4

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800220001-0

[Since the Sino-Soviet split broke into the open, the Chinese have repeatedly implied that the Russians were unfaithful to their treaty obligations. Peking's propaganda has called the Soviets "untrustworthy cowards" and denigrated Soviet military strength as a "tin-pointed spear."]

25X

[In an interview with Egyptian newsmen last spring, Chou En-lai implied that the USSR might not come to China's assistance if the US attacked and claimed that in any case Peking would prefer the Soviets to stand clear. In his widely publicized interview last September, Foreign Minister Chen Yi went so far as to suggest that the Soviets might even join the US and its allies if they attacked China. Chou told a foreign diplomat in November that the USSR would not come to Peking's assistance, or even seek to prevent a US attack.]

25X1

[The Soviets have been more cautious in implying that China's growing hostility toward the USSR was tending to undercut the validity of the treaty. Moscow has issued a number of guarded public warnings to this effect since September 1963--noting that Soviet power would not necessarily be available to "unfriendly" socialist states or those which embarked on irresponsible pursuit of their own special aims and interests. [the Russians have recently given wide circulation to an official document which charges that China is trying to provoke a war between the USSR and the US. This accusation may be intended in part to prepare the ground for the Soviets to disavow any obligation to support China militarily should it become embroiled in a war with the US. For the moment, however, neither side is willing to bear the onus of publicly disavowing the 1950 treaty. Both Moscow and Peking paid lip service to its validity in commemorating the 16th anniversary of the agreement on 14 February.]

25X1

25X1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

NOTES

Congo: The reconvening of the legislature early this week will give the Congo's disgruntled politicians a platform from which to attack President Mobutu. Former premier Tshombé, one of the few politicos with significant popular support, reportedly will return from Europe to attend the session and gauge Mobutu's strength. Although the Mobutu regime has lost much of its luster, the opposing politicians still appear to lack the resources to overthrow it.

25X1

Ghana: Nkrumah appears to have accepted for now his inability to reverse the recent army coup in Ghana, although he apparently harbors illusions that the public does not support it. In a private conversation on 4 March [with the US chargé,] Nkrumah said his only plan was to join his family in Cairo soon. Nkrumah professed not to believe the US was involved in the coup and seemed not to take his designation as "President of Guinea" seriously.

25X1

*Guatemala: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST) Julio Cesar Mendez of the Revolutionary Party (PR) has taken the lead in early presidential returns from Guatemala City. Thus far the PR leads with about 55 percent of the vote. Heavy security forces patrolled the city and, although the polling places were crowded, no untoward incidents have been reported.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800220001-0

THE PRÉSIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800220001-0

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET